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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/07/2011 Accident number: 758 
Accident time: 08:30 Accident Date: 07/07/2010 
Where it occurred: AF/0701/07772, MF 
0351, Zawu village, 
Paktya Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Other Date of main report: None 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: P2Mk2 AT blast Ground condition: dry/dusty 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 15/07/2011 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
mechanical detonation (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] MDU-05 DEMINING INCIDENT  
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Gardiz to investigate the demining incident 
involving a Front End Loader (FEL) machine of [Demining group] MDU-05. The incident 
occurred at 08:30 am on 07 July 2010 at minefield # AF/0701/07772/MF 0351, located in 
Zawu village, centre of Paktya Province. 
SUMMARY: 
The minefield # 0351 is located in Zawu village around 20Km southern side of Gardiz city, it is 
an AT mines (P2MK2) contaminated area. The mines have been laid by Mujahidin to block 
the movement of Russian tanks and their possible attacks.  
On 7th July 2010 at 08:30 KAB 174 Rippers FEL of [Demining group] MDU-05 started ground 
processing operations in MF 0351, supporting MDG-20 in their clearance operations. During 
this operation a P2MK2 anti-vehicle mine exploded on its right back tyre and caused 
damages to it and its wheel. Fortunately there is no any casualty involved in this incident. 
According to the investigation report, this MDU started operations from the safe area and 
gradually proceeded into the MF, on the way back to safe area, the machine entered in un-
cleared area, initiated a mine and caused incident. The machine operator was not able to see 
his way back because of dust raised by a strong wind, but still he continued to reverse his 
machine, so entered in un-cleared area. Although the team leader called him in radio to stop 
driving back, but it was late and the incident happened immediately. The operator maintained 
20-30cm of safety margin when he was conducting operation and reversing his machine to 
start new lane for processing.  
CONCLUSIONS: 
It is the conclusion of investigation team that the incident happened because of 2 factors: 
Carelessness of machine operator as he could not realize the safe ground from the 
contaminated, but continued to reverse his machine 
Short and limited safety margin for the machine operation. This factor is relating to site 
operations management, command and control.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
[Demining group] is recommended to conduct a one day refresher training focussing on safety 
measures during the operations. 
The safety margin for FEL operation should be reviewed by [Demining group] operations 
department. 
Practical steps should be taken for the improvement of supervision, command and control in 
the field. 
Feedback on any preventive and constrictive actions taken by [Demining group] is required to 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
machine’s external controller gave instructions about the operator’s error too late for him to 
avoid entering the unsafe area. The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate training because 
the problem with dust was predictable and it seems that those involved in the incident had not 
prepared for it.  
It is hard to see how the operator could maintain a safety overlap of 20-30cm during 
operations when he could not see because of dust raised by the machine. Having good 
visibility is a problem in many ground-engaging mechanical operations, meaning that 
effectively the driver is “radio controlled” by an observer. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible 
than the internationals with overall responsibility.  
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